HIGHLIGHTS IN THE DEBATE OVER THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA'S CHRISTOLOGY
AND SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR A FRESH APPROACH ^{[ 1 ]}

╘John S. Romanides

Основные моменты дискуссии по поводу христологии Феодора Мопсуэтского и некоторые предложения для более нового подхода к проблеме

протопресвитер Иоанн Романидис (+), профессор догматического богословия Фессалоникского университета

(англ. яз. В 2-х частях)

[ Part 1 ]

In 1932 and 1933 A. Mingana published two newly discovered Syriac versions of Theodore of Mopsuestia's lost Catechetical Orations on the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Mysteries and thereby touched off a lively debate which reached a sort of climax in recent years with scholars still sharply divided. In his comprehensive study entitled "The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia," A. Sullivan concludes that ` . . . it cannot be denied that Theodore of Mopsuestia; despite his orthodox intentions, was indeed what he has so long been called: the 'Father of Nestorianism.' "<sup>[ 2 ]</sup> In sharp contrast to this no less a Cyrilian scholar than Paul Galtier can claim that "La `conjonction' dont parle Théodore est manifestement la même que celle que Cyrille appellera `Hypostatique.' "^{[ 3 ]}

In 1946 E. Amann published the first comprehensive study of Theodore's theology based on all the now available sources.^{[ 4 ]} Although the author recognized some Nestorianizing tendencies in Theodore, he is on the whole satisfied with the Christology of both the condemned fragments and the Catechetical Orations as translated and printed by Mingana. He sees no contradiction between the old and the newly discovered sources. He believes that Theodore's Christology is in fundamental agreement with the Chalcedonian doctrine of two natures. After quoting a fragment preserved by Facundus of Hermiane he comments, "c'est presque 1'expression de ЖЩСИР ЕМУПЭСТАТОР qui'imaginera Léonce de Byzance."^{[ 5 ]}

In 1948 R. Devreesse's "Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste"^{[ 6 ]} appeared, containing an exhaustive study of the historical vicissitudes of Theodore's theological reputation together with a careful analysis of the political and theological factors which led finally to his condemnation by the Fifth Ecumenical Council in 553. Approximately half of the book is devoted to the history of the process leading to the condemnation, and the remainder ta a review of the sources (4-52), to a study of Theodore's exegetical method (53-93), to an exposition of Theodore's doctrinal system (94-124), of which only nine pages (109- 118) are devoted to the Incarnation and Christology, and to a fifteen page review of the extracts from Theodore's writings condemned by Pope Vigilius and the Fifth Ecumenical Council. These fifteen pages compose Chapter IX of a book of ten chapters, and as they are a detailed attempt to prove the complete unreliability of the Conciliar fragments, so many of which are supposed to have been deliberately falsified by the enemies of Theodore, they come as a climax ta more than support the contention of the preceding 117 page historical narrative and documentation of a messy business. Without raising the question of the justice or injustice of Theodore's condemnation one wonders whether Chapter IX should have been included in or just after the discussion of sources. Chapters IV-VIII obviously presuppose Chapter IX. Any reader reacting normally to the historical presentation would by the time he reaches Chapter IX more than welcome evidence of deliberate falsification to round out his indignation.

The work of Devreesse is not only indispensable for the study of Theodore, but also presents an important contribution to the imaginative theory concerning a one-sided emphasis in Eastern Christology on Cyrilian categories, leading finally to the abandonment of strict chalcedonianism for what is by some called the nea-chalcedonianism of the Fifth Ecumenical Council.^{[ 7 ]} The crux of this thesis is the contention that under the pressure of the monophysite schism the Orthodox of the East were forced into a position of diplomatic compromise and, in what amounts to an outright rejection of the chalcedonlan balance between Alexandrian and Antiochene Christolagy, made the theopassianism of Cyril's twelfth anathema the tessera of Orthodoxy. It is this one-sided overthrow of the chalcedonian balance, initiated by the Scythian Monks, which, according to Devreesse, opened up the way to the condemnation of Theodore.

I. Ortiz de Urbina ^{[ 8 ]} seems to be the only one of the early reviewers who challenged Devreesse's thesis concerning the falsification and general unreliability of the condemned fragments. Three years after the appearance of Devreesse's "Essai" A. Sullivan ^{[ 9 ]} published an article strongly contesting Devreesse's manipulation of the texts and rejecting his conclusion of unreliability. Thereupon, in 1953, J. L. McKenzie ^{[ 10 ]} composed an article taking exception to Sullivan. In his introductory remarks he mentions that it is the first time that Sullivan's name appears in scholarly publications and judging from his article one should expect to see it often in the future. Then he proceeds to prove that Theodore's exegesis of John I, 46-51 was in a few instances deliberately and maliciously quoted out of context, thereby making it appear that the Mopsuestian held opinions which he actually attributed to Nathaniel.

While this lively discussion over the textual problem was going on, The Irish Theological Quarterly printed a very instructive article by Kevin McNamara entitled "Theodore of Mopsuestia and the Nestorian Heresy."^{[ 11 ]} McNamara rejects all attempts to discredit the condemned fragments as sources in the study of Theodore's Christology. The first part of his article, in which he takes a definite stand on the reliability of the fragments, appeared before the publication of McKenzie's short study just mentioned and undoubtedly explains his complete confidence in the available sources. McNamara recognizes fully the obvious one-sidedness of the collections made to discredit Theodore, but sees no reason why they cannot be used. "What is beyond all doubt, however and, let us stress it again, it is the essential point - [writes McNamara] is that for Theodore the problem of Christ's unity was the problem of the unity of two subsisting natures, and with this premise it was inevitable that he should set up what was in fact nothing more than an accidental union. His attempt to analyse the manner of the union showed up this fact quite clearly. His failure was a warning to the later Antiochenes against further attempts to speculate on the relation between the union of natures in Christ and other kinds of union. Yet - though we are not here concerned directly with their teaching - it seems clear that Nestorius and Theodoret of Cyrus also failed to approach the problem from the standpoint of the appropriation by the Word of the human nature, and so that human nature was inevitably for them, too, a human person. Aristotelian philosophy with which the Antiochenes, more than other Christian thinkers of their time, were familiar, could not suggest that it was anything else; fór Aristotle the individual substance was, quite understandably, always complete in itself and independent."^{[ 12 ]}

Three years later, in 1956, Sullivan's name appeared in a decisive manner as the author of the major work already mentioned in which he accepts two groups of passages as the only examples of deliberate distortion of the original intent by quoting out of context.

In his insistence on the general unreliability of the hostile fragments Devreesse had found strong support in the works of Marcel Richard, ^{[ l3 ]} who also had concluded categorically that the theology of Theodore can no longer be culled from the condemned dogmatic fragments published in Migne or Swete.^{[ l4 ]} Sullivan devotes 123 pages of his thesis checking and testing the contentions of Richard and Devreesse. While admitting that the fragments present a one-sided view of Theodore's Christology, since those passages were collected which demonstrate the heretical points of his theology, Sullivan claims: "We have now considered all the evidence offered by Richard and Devreesse to prove the thesis that the fragments of Theodore's works preserved in the hostile florilegia are so generally corrupted that they should be ignored in a study of his Christology. We believe we have shown that this thesis is substantiated only to the extent that in a relatively small number of cases, the conciliar extract is so cut from its context as to give a misleading citation. On the other hand, in not a single case does the alleged forgery, interpolation, or textual alteration remain as the only possible, or indeed, as the more probable explanation of textual variants between the hostile fragments, and independent versions of Theodore's work. It should be noticed that there is not a single case where the text of a hostile fragment differs from a reliable Greek citation of the same passage. The case for textual alteration rests entirely on the witness of translations: in particular, Syriac translations. It presumes that these translations are so literally faithful to the original Greek that variations from them would prove a hostile citation to have been maliciously altered."^{[ 15 ]}

In his exposition of Theodore's Christology Sullivan attempts to prove that the Antiochene theology concerning the person of Christ developed out of the Arian controversy. The Arians attributed all the human frailties of Christ to the nature of the Logos and thereby tried to prove His created and inferior status. St. Athanasius attacked the Arians by maintaining on the one hand the traditional attribution of all human properties and activities to the Logos, but on the other hand he made a clear distinction between the Word in His uncreated nature and the Same Word united to humanity by means of His Birth from the Virgin. The Logos is born, lives the life of rzian, suffers, and is resurrected not in His divine nature but in His humanity.

The Antiochene theologians reacted to the Arian argument quite differently. Whereas Eustathius of Antioch attributes human acts to the Logos before the Arian controversy, and even applies the title "Deigenetricem"^{[ 16 ]} to the Virgin, he later changed his mode of speaking and introduced two subjects of attribution. Divine properties and acts belong strictly to God the Word, whereas all things of human nature belong to Him in Whom the Word dwells.

Apollinaris vigorously opposed this position and insisted on the attribution of all things pertaining to the human and divine in Christ to the Logos. The Logos was born from the Virgin without any change or transformation of the divine nature and it was the Logos Who suffered in the flesh. In this respect this was the same position adopted by St. Athanasius, except that Apollinaris went to the extreme of safeguarding the identity of the Logos as the only subject in Christ by insisting that the Logos took the place of the Platonic '�'yE�ov�nòv or n�v�i�nòv in Christ. Since a complete man is a vov5 sv sapnì, and since Christ is just such a vov5, but the divine vov5 év 6a�n�, Christ is both perfect God and perfect man, One, not two. Therefore, in Christ there is one energy and one composite nature.

Following the general line of Eustathius, Diodore of Tarsus vigorously attacked the Apollinaris position. Sullivan takes note of Grillmeier's contention that in spite of his anti-Apollinarinism Diodore still adheres to the "Logos-flesh" Christology. Diodore did not center his attack on Apollinaris on the question of the human mind in Christ. Diodore was above all concerned with the Apollinaris mixture of Logos and flesh into one nature, and by insisting on the distinction of natures ended up with a distinction of subjects. Sullivan goes to much trouble finding passages in Diodore to demonstrate that he taught the completeness of Christ's human nature and concludes that the "Logos- flesh scheme applied to Diodore by Grillmeier may be misleading.

After a short discussion of M. Jugie's work on Diodore,^{[ l7 ]} wherein the chief error of the bishop of Tarsus is described as his failure to distinguish between nature and person, Sullivan returns to his main argument and demonstrates how Diodore reacted against the Apollinarists. While attacking their mixture of the human and divine in Christ into one nature, Diodore failed to recognize "the true principle which Apollinaris had been trying, though unsuccessfully, to explain and defend. In other words, there was an element of truth in the system of Apollinaris: a recognition of the fact that the Word had truly been born, according to the flesh, of the Virgin Mary, and that Jesus of Nazareth was not another person distinct from the eternal Son of God."^{[ l8 ]} Diodore failed to see this and therefore distinguished between Him Who is the Son of Gad by nature and him who is both by nature the son of David and by grace the son of God.

The description of this theological milieu, within which Theodore was theologically nourished, is a very valuable and well done piece of work which supplies the foundations of Sullivan's exposition of Theodore's Christology. Basically Theodore remained faithful to the theological method of his predecessors. However, he made an important advance aver them by realizing that the lack of unity had been a grave weakness of their Christology and tried to correct it. "The distinction of the two natures in Christ, and their union in one prosopon, is the characteristic of Theodore's Christology at every period of his career. . . . In view of Theodore's consistent stress on the union of the two natures in one person, one may ask how it can be that there is still question of his orthodoxy on this question of the unity of Christ."^{[ l9 ]} Sullivan devotes 105 carefully written pages to a detailed examination of texts in order to determine " (1) Theodore's concept of the `two natures'; (2) his concept of their union: .rcil. the incarnation; (3) his concept of the 'one person' in whom the two natures are united."<sup>[ 20 ]</sup> Since we will mention some of the important points of Sullivan's handling of the material later in this paper we may at present quote his final remarks which will help understand some of the reactions. Sullivan concludes: "The cardinal point of contradiction between Cyril and Nestorius turned precisely on the question whether or not God the Word is the Subject of whom the Creed said: `He was born of the Virgin Mary.' According to Nestorius, this can be said of 'Christ,' of `the Son,' of `the Lord,' - but not of God the Word. In this he showed himself a faithful exponent of the principles of Theodore of Mopsuestia. The decision of the Fathers of Ephesus meant that it was not sufficient to unite the two natures in one prosopon. One did not do justice to the basic fact of Christianity unless one understood that this `one person,' this subject of whom the Creed said both that He was begotten of the Father, and that He was barn of the Virgin Mary - is in fact none other than God the Word. If the failure to recognize this fact is the root-error of Nestorius, then it cannot be denied that Theodore of Mopsuestia, despite his orthodox intentions, was indeed what he has so long been called: the `Father of Nestorianism.' "^{[ 21 ]}

It is interesting to note that Sullivan maintains a balance in his use of the hostile fragments by studying "them in the light of all other evidence." ^{[ 22 ]} In other words the question of the reliability of the hostile fragments does not present one with the key to Sullivan's method of arriving at a synthesis of Theodore's Christology. In this respect Sullivan shows a tendency to subordinate these fragments somewhat by not allowing them an independent authority.

Keeping this in mind one finds it instructive to turn to the article of Paul Galtier entitled "Théodore de Mopsueste: Sa vraie pensée sur 1'Incarnation," published the year after Sullivan's thesis appeared.^{[ 23 ]} While he evidently accepts Sullivan's defense of the reliability of the condemned fragments,^{[ 24 ]} and even adds some arguments to the cause ^{[ 25 ]} he takes strong exception to Sullivan's interpretation of Theodore. As a standard for judging Theodore, Sullivan had followed the suggestion of Grillmeier and used the Nicean Creed as expounded at the Council of Ephesus which accepted the second letter of Cyril to Nestorius as containing the substance of the Church's faith.^{[ 26 ]} Galtier flatly rejects this as illogical and unjust. " . . . est-il juste et logique de juger du langage de Théadore d'après celui de saint Cyrille?"^{[ 27 ]} Cyril can be used as a standard only in the light of St. Leo, and St. Leo can be used only in the light of St. Cyril. Sullivan's way of presenting the issue is actually no different from that of the Monophysites who rejected Leo's Tome to Flavian. Here Galtier is touching upon the very nerve center of the whole discussion concerning the Christology and condemnation of the bishop of Mopsuestia. The basic theological presuppositions of such scholars as Devreesse, Richard and C. Moeller, who either explicitly or implicitly support the theories concerning chalcedonianism and neo-chalcedonianism mentioned above, are quite clear. If the Council of Chalcedon is viewed as a restoration of the Christological balance upset temporarily by the one-sided Cyrilian Council of Ephesus in 431,^{[ 27a ]} and if the Fifth Ecumenical Council is. regarded as a return to the Alexandrian exclusiveness of the Third Council, then the theology of Theodore should be viewed in the light of Chalcedon. The very basis for the condemnation of Theodore at the Fifth Council was the fact that under pressure from the "imperial couple" to adopt a diplomatic theology the Eastern bishops accepted Cyril's exclusiveness to the practical exclusion of Leo's Tome. Theodore cannot be judged, therefore, from this one-sided point of view. In order to maintain this thesis some Roman scholars are prepared to claim that Pope Vigilius did not accept the dogmatic definitions contained in the anathemas of the Fifth Council. This leaves Chalcedon as the only possible standard of orthodox Christology and the only acceptable standard for judging Theodore.

Having this viewpoint in mind it is quite obvious that Sullivan has left himself wide open by using Cyril and Ephesus as his point of departure. McKenzie also charged Sullivan with setting for Theodore an impossible canon of orthodoxy in an article which appeared in 1958.^{[ 28 ]} Judging from the method adopted in his book as well as by his answer to McKenzie it is quite obvious that Sullivan has not fully grasped the fact that he unwittingly side-tracked himself by taking Grillmeier's suggestion seriously, and instead of arguing to the point he has been arguing past it. From an authoritarian viewpoint, which one would ordinarily expect about the early Ecumenical Synods from Roman Catholics, Sullivan's presentation could be considered a self-sufficient study which has definitely proved its point. However, the whole issue is very much complicated by the fact that the scholars in question do not take Ephesus seriously. It is worth noting that they may be quite verbose about Cyril's one-sidedness but they never openly question the Council of Ephesus, which was completely dominated by this same Cyril. They simply insist on Chalcedon and overcome the Council of 553 in the manner mentioned.

With this background in mind one can very much appreciate Galtier's penetrating analysis of Theodore's Christology. Being a specialist in the linguistic variations of patristic theology, he brings his keen insight to bear and attempts to demonstrate that Theodore's theology is quite sound when his language is approached within the geographical setting of his own time. There is no need to take seriously the question of the reliability or unreliability of the hastile fragments, because actually when seen within the time and place in which they were written, and understood within the general context of Theadore's theology, these fragments are quite sound. Although Theodore �vas using a different language, he was professing in substance the same doctrine as Cyril. The reason why the fragments in question were condemned by Cyril and the Fifth Council is that they were not fully understood. Galtier attempts to prove that for Theodore, as far Cyril, the prosopon effected by the union of the two natures in Christ is the very prosopon of the Holy Trinity. He rejects as absurd the idea that for Theodore the prosopon effected by the union is a tertium guid. As one of the keys to his argument Galtier takes one of the supposedly most unreliable Greek texts and points out very convincingly that in speaking about each perfect nature as having its own prosopon when considered apart and one prosopon in common when considered in union, Theodore is not saying that there are two prosapa. Therefore, he does not see why the Syriac translation should be considered more faithful and what exactly the Apollinarists gained by doctaring up such a passage as this, as Richard claims.^{[ 29 ]} There are two persons corresponding to the two perfect natures only when one considers each nature abstractly. In reality, however, there can never have been two prosopa since the union was never preceded by any division. "Eoxs �sv Eir�v5 É� áp��5 �v z� n,aiá z�v ��iOav ó�a�?�áos� i�v npò5 avzóv évwoav. ^{[ 30 ]} Theodore's speaking of the prosopon effected by the union then is no different from Cyril's way of speaking abstractly about two vno6zá6si5 or �pv6E�5 being united, so that "after the union, the separation having been abolished, we believe that the nature of the Son is one, as belonging to one who however has become man and flesh.^{[ 31 ]} According to Galtier, the real difficulty underlying this Theodorean and Cyrilian manner of speaking abstractly about two natures or prosopa before the union and concretely of one prosopon or nature after the union, was the fact that opv6�5, vnóóza6�5 and �Póswnov were still synonymous and inseparable in the field of Christology at this time. The distinctions already made between cpva�5, or ovsí,a on the one hand and vnó6iaa�5 or n8ó6wxov on the other for the doctrine of the Trinity had not yet been introduced into Christology, and the Chalcedonian contribution of an áaoóawno5 or ávv�óoiaios human cpv6�5 was yet in the future.

A key passage offered by Galtier to prove his general position is one in which the Logos as subject unites the man to Himself and thereby the Logos Himself becomes the unique prosopon of the union. ^{[ 32 ]} Perhaps the strongest point of Galtier's presentation, at least for one with a critical eye for loopholes, is his insistence that "Theodore never dreamed of defining the nature or the mode of this union. On the contrary, here again is a point on which he is in advance of one mind ivith St. Cyril. In effect both proclaim absolutely its ineffable character. . . . Questioned about the sense of the expression na�' vnóazaa�v, he (Cyril� called it `physical,' in opposition to a moral union; but to those who asked what he means by `physical union,' one knows that he always restricted himself to the answer: `real union.' "^{[ 33 ]} However, it is questionable whether Galtier's thesis can srand a stiff test at this very point. Would it have been really possible for Theodore to agree with Cyril's �va�n� or na�' v�ó6ias�v �vwa�5 without giving up his basic presuppositions ? Nestorius' reaction to this term was violent and there are good indications that Theodore would have at least had strong hesitations. Although Sullivan did not discuss this aspect, he did devote the first part of his synthesis to the failure of Theodore to distinguish between what could be predicated to the nature of the Word and to the Word as such, and thereby made a very important contribution to a correct approach. This failure of Theodore is very interesting because Sullivan's forefathers in theology were accused of heresy during the Filioque controversy for exactly this same failure.

Before he could acquire a copy of Galtier's article McKenzie had already committed the review of Sullivan's book mentioned above to the press and just managed to include a footnote in which he seems surprised at how Galtier arrived at his conclusions "with few references to falsifications by the compilers of the extracts of Theodore's works."^{[ 34 ]} In this article McKenzie strongly challenges Sullivan's treatment of the reliability of the Syriac versions and his synthesis of Theodore's Christology. McKenzie reviews Sullivan's treatment of two texts and two groups of texts and makes the following strong point: "No doubt Sullivan is right in warning that it would be rash to apply to these three capitula the adage, A �no disce oyrcnes, and hence to reject the conciliar extracts en bloc (Sullivan, p. 111 ) . But it is also rash, I think, to affirm that, because a man has been proved a liar in three instances, he is therefore reliable in other instances where no proof has been adduced, particularly when the motive of the lie which has been proved is also operative in the other instances. There is no similar proof which casts doubt on the veracity of the Syriac translators. Sullivan's suspicions may be correct; but even after Sullivan's examination no convincing reason is presented why we should trust the mendacious compilers of the florilegia where they differ from the Syriac translators. To trust the translators is not to afhrm the 'absolute literal accuracy' of their work, nor to deny that they were subject to the human weaknesses of translators. But we do not know that they were deliberately perverting the evidence; we do know that the compilers were. . . . It has been proved, and Sullivan has accepted the proof, that the compilations. exhibit in some instances the compiler's way of putting a thought rather than that of the author; and it has certainly been shown that the compilers did not feel themselves bound to reproduce every phrase, every last word of their prototype. Until the dishonesty and bad faith of the Syriac translators have been equally well demonstrated, it is difficult to see how we can treat the two sources as of equal value. I do not say, indeed, that Sullivan treats them as of equal value; but his insistence that they must be used if one is to form a complete synthesis of Theodore's Christology must be taken with qualification."^{[ 35 ]}

McKenzie is actually defending the conclusions which he had reached in the eleven-page article printed in 1953 already mentioned. As we have seen, Sullivan accepts McKenzie's cantention that the compiler's quoting of Theodore out of context in interpreting John 1:46-51 has deliberately presented him in an unfavorable light. McKenzie does not see, however, why Sullivan does not agree with his conclusions.

Three quarters of a year later Sullivan answered McKenzie in a well written article entitled "Further Notes on Theodore of Mopsuestia."^{[ 36 ]} In his defense of his treatment of the hostile fragments he does not hesitate to call upon Galtier ^{[ 37 ]} for help in regard to the one fragment mentioned. In his discussion concerning "The Value of the Syriac Versions" Sullivan agrees with McKenzie on the question of how much literal accuracy one may expect from the Syriac translations and points out the fact that Richard and Devreesse presupposed extraordinary literal accuracy. When Sullivan is suggesting that in some cases the more likely explanation of a discrepancy is to be sought in the departure of the translator from the original, he does not see why we should be bound to demonstrate the dishonesty and bad faith of the translator as McKenzie demands.^{[ 38 ]} "In the first place the departure may have been indeliberate. In the second place, they can be judged only by the standards that were expected of translators of their own day."^{[ 39 ]}

In the second part of his answer Sullivan defends himself against McKenzie's charge of setting an impossible canon of orthodoxy for Theodore's lifetime. One cannot help but sense that this part is intended also as an answer to Galtier's similar accusation. For the reasons already mentioned Sullivan seems to have missed the point. In the last section of his answer Sullivan seems to successfully defend his thesis against McKenzie's counter-interpretations of certain texts.

There are several other scholars who have dealt with Theodore's theology since the Mingana publications of 1932-33. Some of the defenders of the traditional view of Theodore's Nestorianism are M. Jugie,^{[ 40 ]} W. De Vries,^{[ 41 ]} J. M. Vosté,^{[ 42 ]} M. Anastos,^{[ 43 ]} and H. M. Diepen.^{[ 44 ]} A. Grillmeier^{[ 45 ]} and T. Camelot^{[ 46 ]} recognize the basic elements in Theodore which finally lead to Nestorianism. R. V. Sellers^{[ 47 ]} and J. N. D. Kelly^{[ 48 ]} maintain the basic soundness of Theodore's Christology within the background of the healthy elements of Antiochene Christology generally and at the same time recognize its typical Antiochene weaknesses. Kelly utilizes few of Sullivan's paints and rejects his basic conclusion. "Theodore was no Nestorian, and the doctrine of `two Sons' repelled him."<sup>[ 49 ]</sup> Although Kelly does not seem to have Galtier's work on Theodore in mind, his conclusions are very similar. He writes that Theodore's "true teaching, it would seem, is that the Incarnate is `one prosopon,' and by this he means that He is the `one subject' Who can be addressed now as God and now as man. This comes out in the fact that, while he was constantly alert to distinguish in his exegesis between the two natures, he was also aware that Scripture spoke of the two natures together. The Bible, as he points out, predicates what belongs both to the divinity and to the humanity `as of one alone' (Hom. cat. 6, 6; 8,10; 8, 11 f.) ; it applies different titles to Christ `as to a single prosopon' (Ib. 3, 10). So prosopon in his vocabulary connoted `Person' in the fullest sense of the word. The Godman, he declares, is one prosopon, and he nowhere speaks of there being two prosopa before, or in abstraction from (a disagreement with Galtier) , the union of the natures. Such a doctrine has been attributed to him, but on the basis of texts which have been tampered with by his later detractors.."^{[ 50 ]} Kelly does not specify which texts he is referring to. Actually there is only one Greek text in which such an interpretation and reliability problem was clearly seen ^{[ 50a ]} and it was already mentioned together with Galtier's penetrating analysis of it. For this text there is a Syriac parallel which twice mentions one prosopon and one hypostasis when contemplating the union. Of this text Kelly says, "We are bound to regard the Syriac version with considerable suspicion."^{[ 51 ]} One wonders if Kelly means to throw suspicion on both Greek and Syriac versions of this text.

Of course it is beyond the scope of this paper to take up the question of the hostile fragments in detail. However, there are certain texts which have been singled out for special discussion in the above mentioned debate between Sullivan and McKenzie. We will make some remarks about three of these texts hoping thereby to make some helpful suggestions to a more balanced approach.

The first textual problem we will deal with is McKenzie's alleged proof that the compiler of the hostile fragments deliberately quoted Theodore's interpretation of John 1:46-51 out of context in order to make it appear that Nathaniel's use of the terms `King' and `Son of God' expressed the mind of Theodore. When these passages are read within context it is obvious that Theodore considered Nathaniel's understanding at this time inadequate and carnal. McKenzie thinks, and Sullivan agrees, that this exegesis is perfectly sound, and would be shared by most modern Scripture scholars.

It is quite obvious that both Sullivan and McKenzie failed to realize that the compiler was not a modern Scripture scholar but a man of his own times. It is very possible that the compiler did not agree with Theodore's interpretation of Nathaniel's mind. It is more than probable that the compiler believed that Nathaniel fully understood what he was saying in confessing, "Rabbi, thou art the Son of God, thau art the king af Israel." In his commentary on this passage St. Cyril takes great care to prove how and why Nathaniel came to realize that Christ is the Only-Begotten Son of God. According to Cyril, Nathaniel knew fully well what he was confessing. ^{[ 52 ]} Origen goes to the trouble to point out that this passage is not referring to "one of many sons, but to the Only-Begotten, being the king of the chosen race."^{[ 53 ]} This interpretation of Nathaniel's mind is diametrically opposed to that of Theodore. There can be no reason to doubt that the Apollinarists were using such an interpretation of Nathaniel's confession to prove that Christ is the natural Son of God. This is clearly reflected in Theodore's insistence in the condemned Capitula 34 that "Certainly (Nathaniel) was saying that he was son of God not according to the birth of divinity, but because he was familiar with God . . . " For those engaged in such a controversy over the interpretation of this confession the insertion of the whole context within which Theodore refers to the obscure and carnal nature of Nathaniel's mind would not serve to clear the bishop of Mopsuestia but only demonstrate further his perverseness. It would be more than normal for the opponents of Theodore to think: "Every pious Christian knows that Nathaniel fully understood that Christ is the natural Son of God begotten of the Father before the ages. Only a heretic could deny this." It is extremely naive to think that the compiler felt that he had to quote deliberately out of context, especially when there are numerous other passages in which Theodore denies that He Who was born of the Virgin is the natural and Only-Begotten Son of God and consubstantial with the Father. The fact that Theodore considers Nathaniel's understanding obscure and carnal at this point does not mean that he elsewhere professes to believe that the natural Son of God became the natural Son of Mary, thus making it necessary for the compiler to deliberately distort and misrepresent the real mind of Theodore. It must also be remembered that the passages under question express clearly Theodore's understanding of the prevailing Jewish ideas about the coming Messiah which most modern students of the Bible would at least tolerate. However, there is every indication to believe that such tolerance was not characteristic of the times under question. Proof of this is the fact that the compiler presented Theodore's understanding of Nathaniel's mind for condemnation.

One may add at this point that the same observations are applicable to the similar case of quoting out of context in regard to Theodore's commentary on the Centurion's faith expressed in Matthew 8:5-13.54 Vigilius is clearly aware that the fragments express the mind of the Centurion and not that of the author. Yet the Pope condemns this inadequate interpretation of the Centurion's faith. Sullivan thinks that Vigilius would have revised his criticism had he seen the whole context. This is certainly an unrealistic attitude since Vigilius is clearly finding fault with Theodore's interpretation of the Centurion's faith and already knows Theodore's faith from so many other passages in which Christ is Son of God not by nature, but by grace. Here again it is clear that the compiler was not interested in the context, but in Theodore's interpretation of the Centurion's faith.

One of the important problems regarding the hostile fragments centers in a text preserved in Greek by Leontius of Byzantium which we already mentioned when discussing Galtier's study of Theodore. As we have seen Galtier fails to see how this passage is supposed to help the Apollinarist cause as Richard seems to think. Theodore here speaks of two prosopa in abstraction only. Concretely there can be only one prosopon effected by the union before which there was no division. "For when we distinguish the natures," writes Theodore, "we eall the nature of God perfect, and (we call) the person perfect also, because it is impossible to speak of an impersonal hypostasis. We call likewise the nature of man perfect, and the person (we call perfect) as well. But when we look toward the conjunction, we then say one person . . . thus when we attempt to distinguish the natures, we call the person of the man perfect, and that of the divinity also perfect. When we contemplate the union, then we proclaim the person to be one, the natures two.''^{[ 56 ]}

There is a Syriac version of this text (cod. 14669) published by Sachau6g and translated literally back into Greek by Richard,^{[ 57 ]} in which the clause "because it is impossible to speak of an impersonal hypostasis," is omitted. On the other hand wherever the Leontius fragment speaks of "one person" the Syriac fragment adds the phrase "one hypostasis." Richard favors the Syriac text because he suspects the extra clause in the Leontius fragment. He points out that the only way this clause makes any sense is when "hypostasis" is taken as being synonymous with "nature." Richard reasons that since "hypostasis" and "nature" had already been distinguished in the doctrine of the Trinity, this phrase could not mean very much to Theodore's readers. Galtier and Sullivan also accept these terms as being synonymous, but argue that the Trinitarian distinction had not yet been introduced into Christology. To these observations one may add a possible explanation of the seemingly sharp differences between the Syriac and Greek texts which does not make it necessary to suspect the honesty of either the compiler or the Syriac translator.

It would have been quite normal for a mild chalcedonian, wishing to see in Theodore an orthodox father, as was actually the case with some, to understand the clause in question as evidence that Theodore taught that in Christ there is one hypostasis after the union. In other wards, Theodore's remark "it is impossible to speak of an impersonal hypostasis" would also mean "it is impossible to speak of an unhypostatic person." Once this is done the whole passage in question would be translated not literally but according to what the translator takes as its real meaning and in post-chalcedonian language. Thus the clause in question disappears from its proper place and reappears in the same passage elsewhere. We now find ` one hypostasis" added to "one person." But in the Syriac text under consideration this is not all. Every time the word "person" exists by itself it is replaced by "hypostasis" in the Syriac. Thus in the Leontius fragment the word "person" is mentioned six times and "hypostasis" appears only once. In the Syriac text "person" appears twice and "hypostasis" is mentioned four times. The application of Eastern Trinitarian terminology to Theodore's Christology by a chalcedonian friend is obvious.

This substitution of the word hypostasis for person in the works of Theodore became a serious problem for the Nestorians for whom hypostasis and nature were still synonymous.5s In the eighth century the Nestorian Joseph Hazzaya complained of such a systematic interpolation in Theodore's De Incarnatione and De Fide. The interpolator had substituted "one hypostasis" wherever Theodore spoke of ` two hypostases." In his study on Joseph Hazzaya, published in 1910, Addai Scher mentioned that he was in possession of a complete Syriac translation of De Incarnationae in which Theodore speaks of "one hypostasis" in Christ everywhere he was dealing with the question of union. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the defenders of Theodore presented any such texts at the time of the Fifth Ecumenical Council. It is possible perhaps that monophysites may have interpolated some of Theodore's texts to show that the chalcedonian formula of "one hypostasis" and "two natures" is Nestorian.

The third and last group of texts to be examined are related to Theodore's interpretation of Rom. 9:5 where St. Paul speaks of the Jews "from whom is Christ according to the flesh, Who being God over all is blessed unto the ages, amen." In two passages, one preserved by Cyril and the other condemned by Pope Vigilius and the Fifth Council, ^{[ 59 ]} Theodore takes great care to paint out that St. Paul "ita dicit . . . non quod ex Judaeis et secundum carnem est, qui super omnia Deus est" ^{[ 60 ]} or "Nemo igitur neque eum, qui secundum carnem ex Judaeis est, dicat deum, nec iterum deum, qui est super amnia, secundum carnem ex Judaeis." ^{[ 61 ]} Both these fragments have parallels in the Syriac version of Theodore's Catechetical Orations, but here they appear slightly altered, e.g., with the word "naturaliter" added. Thus Theodore says not only that he who is from the Jews according to the flesh is not God, but that he is not "by nature" God. "For there is no one who would recognize that 'He who is born from among the Jews according to the flesh' is by nature God, nor that God over all' is by nature from the Jews." ^{[ 62 ]} There is a third passage in the Syriac text where Rom. 9:5 is interpreted and again the word "naturaliter" appears. ^{[ 63 ]} Both Richard and Devreesse accept the Syriac version as authentic and the Latin fragments as the product of corrupt intentions. Sullivan, of course, defends the authenticity of the Latin fragments, but in such a way that McKenzie is not satisfied. Sullivan spends eight pages ^{[ 64 ]} weaving a series of facts and probabilities into an overall probability in favor of the Latin texts.

Perhaps the mast important point of Cyril's attack on Nestorius is his insistence that He Who was born of the Virgin according to the flesh is by nature God and consubstantial with the Father. St. Athanasius had said this clearly before him. But Nestorius repeatedly denies this and persistently claims that He Who was born of the Virgin is not by nature God and therefore the title Theotokos is dangerous and if used should be done so with strict qualifications. It is only when John of Antioch repudiated Nestorius an this point that peace was restored. In his letter to Cyril, John clearly confessed that the Same Who was born of Mary is consubstantial with the Father according to divinity and consubstantial with us according to the humanity.^{[ 65 ]} This for Cyril meant the acceptance of the full significance of the title Theotokos. In his answer to John, Cyril writes, "For it is your absolute duty clearly to understand that well-nigh the whole of our contest for the faith has been waged round our affirmation that the holy Virgin is Theotokos." ^{[ 66 ]} In the light of this fact it is not necessary to make Cyril out to be an ecclesiastical politician to understand why he could accept the Antiochene way of speaking about two unconfused and undivided natures. That the Son of Mary, or that the Son of David is "naturaliter" the Son of God is the most fundamental Christological insight of Cyril and underlies his whole theology concerning the Theotokos. One must not forget also that this is the very foundation of the Apollinarin attack on Diodore and on this question St. Gregory the Theologian clearly sided with Apollinaris. In this respect at least Apollinaris was certainly victorious over his opponents even at the Council of Chalcedon which clearly insisted that He Who was born of the Theotokos is "consubstantial with the Father according to the divinity." ^{[ 67 ]} It is quite clear, therefore, that there can be no conceivable reason why the Apollinarists or Cyril or any adherent to the Council of Ephesus or the union of 433 would drop the term "naturaliter" from Theodore's texts. Judging from the hostile attitude of the compiler one may rest assured that he would have kept the "naturaliter" since it would have better demonstrated an identity of teaching with Nestorius. Rather than postulate corruption on the part of the Latin texts there seems to be little doubt that the Syriac translator introduced the "naturaliter" in order to make the passages more clearly Nestorian and anti-Cyrilian and at the same time to avoid the impression that Theodore is denying the divinity of Christ altogether. He is certainly not God by nature, but He is God by grace, according to Theodore.

The methodological problem in dealing with Theodore's Christology has confronted us in certain ways, especially in regard to the criterion to be used in determining whether or not he can really be considered the "Father of Nestorianism." At the suggestion of Grillmeier, Sullivan had restricted himself to Cyril and Ephesus as the standard for judgment, leaving the Council of Chalcedon and the Tome of Leo out of' his theological discussion. He simply examines the possible reasons why the Council did not discuss the question of Theodore. ^{[ 68 ]} However, the basic problem is not the question why Theodore personally was not discussed, but whether the Council accepted a profession of faith in essentials similar to that of Theodore. If, as many believe, the Council accepted as sufficiently orthodox what Theodore had already taught, then he is certainly not the "Father of Nestorianism," unless, of course, one believes that Chalcedon was a vindication of Nestorius.

We have mentioned the fact that in a very important way the profession or definition of faith at Chalcedon represents an Apollinarin victory over Diodore and Theodore. It has already been pointed out that the center of controversy between Apollinaris and Diodore was not over the question of the human soul of Christ, nor over the mixture of natures, but rather over the question of the consubstantiality with the Father of Him Who was born of the Virgin. Apollinaris not only insists on this repeatedly, but also speaks of the Logos becoming consubstantial with man because of His union with the Body. Thus Christ "is consubstantial with God according to the invisible spirit, the flesh also being included in the name, because it is united to him who is consubstantial with God, and again He is consubstantial with men, the divinity being included in the body, because it was united to that which is consubstantial with us. The nature of the body, continues Apollinaris, is not changed in the union with Him Who is consubstantial with God and in the participation of the consubstantial name, neither does the nature of Godhead change in the communion of the human body and in the name of the flesh which is consubstantial with us." ^{[ 69 ]} Elsewhere he writes that Christ "therefore did not become son, but is by nature." ^{[ 70 ]} In a letter to a certain Peter he writes, "We say that the Lord is by nature God and by nature man." ^{[ 71 ]} To Jovianum he claims, "He Who was born from the Virgin Mary is by nature God and true God, and not by grace or participation." ^{[ 72 ]}

As we have already indicated, this basic vision of Apollinaris that Christ is both by nature God and by nature man is clearly expressed in the profession of faith of John of Antioch which brought about the union of 433 and is repeated in the Chalcedonian definition. "Following, then, the holy Fathers, we all unanimously teach that our Lord Jesus Christ is to us One and the same Son, the Self-same of a rational soul and body; consubstantial with the Father according to the Godhead, the Self-same consubrtantial with us according to the Manhood . . before the ages begotten of the Father according to the Godhead, but in the last days, the Self-same, for us and for our salvation (born) of Mary the Virgin Theotokos according to the Manhood . . ." ^{[ 73 ]} In commenting on the Chalcedonian profession of the double consubstantiality of Christ neither Bindley ^{[ 74 ]} nor I. Ortiz de Urbina ^{[ 75 ]} suspect that Apollinaris had said the same. Bindley writes that "the latter half, `co-essential with us as to manhood,' had occurred in Nestorius' Sermon 3, and had no doubt come into partial use before this as a counter-statement to the doctrine of Apollinarius that Christ's Body was consubstantial with the Godhead." ^{[ 76 ]} It is noteworthy that Apollinaris not only insisted on the double consubstantiality of Christ, but also proclaims repeatedly that anyone who says that the flesh of Christ is consubstantial with God is anathema. ^{[ 77 ]}

Nestorius never accepted this teaching concerning the double consubstantiality of Him Who was born of the Theotokos. Whether Diodore and Theodore would have finally accepted it along with Theodoret and Ibas when confronted by an Ecumenical Council we will never know. That they threw everything they could muster at Apollinaris exactly on this issue is beyond any question whatever. This is more than clear from Theodore's Contra Apollinarem. After what seems to have been a long argument Theodore asks, "Therefore how do you . . . claim to acknowledge him who was born of the Virgin to be God from God, consubstantial with the Father, unless by chance you command us to impute his creation to the Holy Spirit? . . . Nevertheless, neither according to your own definition is it at all possible to proclaim him who was born of the Virgin to be God from God, consubstantial with the Father. For if, as you say, he who was born from the Virgin was not an assumed man, but God made flesh, how can he who was born be called God from God and consubstantial with the Father, since the flesh is not able to sustain this name? For it is madness to say that God is born of the Virgin. . . . He Who is consubstantial with the Father was not born from a womb . . . " ^{[ 78 ]} This same attack on the double consubstantiality of Christ is clearly repeated in the Catechetical Homilies.^{[ 78 ]}

If Nestorianism can be defined as a denial of the fact that the One Lord Jesus Christ Who was born of the Virgin is consubstantial with the Father according to his divinity and consubstantial with us according to his humanity, then there can be no doubt that Theodore is on this point in essential agreement with Nestorius and in direct opposition to the Council of Chalcedon. It seems that in his arguments with Apollinaris Theodore simply forgot his doctrine of one prosopon in Christ. Why didn't Theodore speak of the one prosopon effected by the union of two natures in Christ as consubstantial with the Father?' The answer is quite simple. The one person in Christ effected by the union of natures is not the second hypostasis of the Holy Trinity. The divine nature or hypostases cannot themselves be united by nature to any creature. As we shall see, Theodore fully agrees with Nestorius at this point.

Using the inductive method of searching through Theodore's works to see if he can find any indication of predicating the human things of Christ to the Logos in distinction from the divine nature, Sullivan comes to the conclusion that the terms Logos and divine nature are actually interchangeable. Sullivan senses that this lack of distinction explains partially Theodore's inability to predicate all the acts of Christ, both divine and human, to the Logos as to one unique subject. ^{[ 79 ]}

One can go further and point out that Theodore's doctrine of the Trinity on essential points is quite different from that of the Alexandrian and Cappadocian Fathers and it is quite obvious that his presuppositions and arguments against the Arians and Eunomians must have differed considerably from theirs.

In Cappadocian and Alexandrian theology the real distinction between the Logos and the Father is based on the belief in a real incarnation of the second hypostasis of the Trinity. One of the most important reasons why the term homoousios was in the beginning suspect was that it could be interpreted in a Sabellian sense as was actually done by Paul of Samosata. It is only when it was made perfectly clear that this term does not imply that the Son is identical with the essence or hypostasis of the Father or with an unhypostasic energy of God that it was accepted by such Fathers as St. Basil. ' `Those who say that essence and hypostasis are identical," writes St. Basil, "are driven to the necessity of confessing different persons only, and by attempting to get around saying three hypostases, they find themselves unable to escape the evil of Sabellius." For the Cappadocians there is a real distinction between essence and hypostasis not only for the exclusion of Sabellianism, but also as a protection against the attacks of Eunomius. This may seem at first paradoxical, but it is true.

Eunomius was arguing that the word "Father" or "Unbegottenness" was a definition of the very hypostasis or essence of God. From this premise he concluded that the hypostasis which is, therefore, "Son" and "begotten" must be heterosubstantial and so a creature. The Cappadocians argued that the words "Father" and "Unbegottenness" are not definitions of the divine essence, but denote the mode of being or existence of a real hypostasis and its relation to the other hypostases of the Trinity. There can be no name or definition of the nature of God. The essence of God is by its very nature unknown to all creatures and beyond the conceptual powers of man. Even the word God cannot be applied to the nature of God because the essence of God is nameless. Every name is in some sense a definition. However, when applied to God names denote either the acts of God or the mode of existence of the divine Persons, but never the essence.

When one turns to Theodore he cannot help but wonder what kind of arguments he could have used against the Arians and Eunomians. Together with Eustathius of Antioch ^{[ 80 ]} he claims that the word God is a name of the divine nature, ^{[ 81 ]} thus giving the impression that the Three Persons of the Trinity shared in either an Aristotelian "substratal preexisting material" or a Platonic type "superstratal genus." ^{[ 82 ]} God is one not so much because the Father is one unique cause and source, as Apollinaris together with the Cappadocians taught. For Theodore , God is one because the divine essence is one. For Eustathius the word God belongs not to the Divine Persons but to the divine essence. Otherwise, there would be three Gods. ^{[ 83 ]}

Theodore seems to go much further than Eustathius. He claims that the word Father is also the name of the divine nature. ^{[ 84 ]} One is immediately reminded of the fact that the Eunomians would agree with this wholeheartedly since it proves that the Son is another essence unlike that of the Father. What kind of answer could Theodore have given the Eunomians an this point? Simply that the Son also is the divine essence and the Holy Spirit likewise. ^{[ 85 ]} Thus it seems that we have here a doctrine of the Trinity not very different in one respect at least from that which prevailed in the West. Each Person is identical with the divine essence, although not identical with the other persons, and God is one not because the Father is the only cause and source of divinity, but because the underlying essence is one and each Person is this essence.

FOOTNOTES

HIGHLIGHTS IN THE DEBATE OVER THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA'S CHRISTOLOGY
AND SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR A FRESH APPROACH ^{[ 1 ]}

╘ John S. Romanides

[ Part 2 ]

When one is confronted with this kind of language one has the right to wonder if he is not dealing with a theology which is maintaining the accepted forms of an official state religion but whose basic presuppositions are quite different. This is certainly to be expected m any situation where the state and hierarchy are constantly struggling to impose a uniformity of faith. There can be no doubt about Theodore's zeal against the Arians and Eunomians. It must be remembered, however, that Sabellius and Paul of Samosata would have shown just as much enthusiasm for the overthrow of this new polytheism. We are not trying to suggest that Theodore was a Sabellian; his fervor against any form of theopassianism would count this out. Nor are we suggesting that he was a crypto-Samosatene. Theodore calls Paul of Samosata an "angel of satan" because "he says that Christ our savior is a simple man and fails to recognize that hypostasis of the divinity of the One before the ages." ^{[ 86 ]} However, the fact that theologians are struggling against each other does not mean that their basic presuppositions are necessarily different. There is a thread of presuppositions running right through Paul of Samosata, the Arians and Nestorians, which bears this point out and also seems to be the key to understanding Theodore's Christology.

Although he seems quite confident that Theodore has no metaphysical explanation to offer for the union of two natures, because the Mopsuestian supposedly considers this to be in the realm of mystery, still Galtier expresses in a footnotes ^{[ 87 ]} a slight reservation by referring to a possible clue in the fragments of Theodore's letter to Domnus. ^{[ 88 ]} Perhaps by tracing out the meaning of this passage in the light of other passages with the help of the general Syrian theological environment we can arrive at a very important clue for the better understanding of both Nestorianism and Arianism.

In this letter Theodore writes "and why is it necessary to say any more? The reason of the union according to essence is true (or applicable) only in the case of consubstantials, but in the case of things not consubstantial it is not applicable {or true), there being no clear (reason) possible for confusion. But the manner of union according to good-will, while preserving the natures, demonstrates the one person of both inseparably, and also the one will and one energy, together with the one authority and rule which is consequent to these." ^{[ 89 ]} It is quite clear that Theodore is here limiting the concept of essential or natural union to consubstantíals. Thus the Persons of the Trinity can be united by nature to each other, but not to things heterosubstantial. To these God can unite Himself only according to good-will. Now the question arises, why does Theodore preclude the possibility that God can unite Himself by nature to something not consubstantial with Himself ? It may be remembered that Nestorius was quite violent on this point against Cyril. Theodoret and the Antiochene bishops generally were also scandalized by Cyril's "natural" or "hypostastic" union. There is every indication to believe that Theodore's reaction to Cyril's terminology would have been generally the same as that of Nestorius.

Before we examine an important text to demonstrate this point one should ask whether Theodore would have heard such language for the first time from Cyril. Of course, the answer is no. He deals with this notion at length and rejects it as being impious. ^{[ 90 ]} Also he was certainly familiar with the theology of his opponent Apollinaris who claimed that Christ is both by nature God and by nature man. On the other hand, it is quite possible that he knew St. Gregory the Theologian's letters to Cledonius attacking not only Apollinaris, but also those who divide Christ by speaking of two Sons and refusing to acknowledge the two births of the Only-Begotten Son of God, one from the Father before the ages and one "afterward of the Virgin Mary."^{[ 91 ]} In his first letter to Cledonius, Gregory speaks of the union in Christ as being according to essence.`' ^{[ 92 ]}

The very fact that Theodore spends a great deal of time discussing the manner by which God dwells in Christ is an indication that he is very much aware of the metaphysical aspects of the problem. Galtier's insistence that for Theodore all this belongs to the realm of mystery is without foundation. In his De Incarnatione Theodore sets out to solve the problem of the divine indwelling in Christ and never once gives the impression that it is really a mystery and therefore cannot be defined. He mentions two opinions concerning the manner of indwelling. "On the one hand some have decided that the indwelling takes place by essence and others by energy" ^{[ 93 ]} Theodore rejects both the Samosatene approach and the traditional approach offered in opposition to Paul of Samosata. God cannot be present in any special place according to essence because this would be a limitation of His infinity. On the other hand, if God is everywhere present by reason of His essence, granting to all the indwelling also, He would be granting this not only to men, but also to irrational and inanimate things. Since both these possibilities are improper, it is nonsense to speak of an indwelling according to nature. Neither can the indwelling take place according to energy because the providential operation of God is everywhere present. The only possibility left is to speak of God effecting His indwelling by His good-will whereby He becomes present in whom He chooses not by any spacial movement from place to place, but by will. Neither is it proper to say that God works His omnipresence by will because then He would have to work His special presence by a necessity of nature. "For thus the infinity is unto Him better preserved, when He does not appear to work by some necessity of the uncircumscribed nature. For if He is omnipresent by will, He will again be found working by necessity, no longer working the presence by opinion, but by the infinity of nature, and having the will following." ^{[ 94 ]}

It should be noted at the very outset that in this passage ОУСъА and ЖЩСИР are synonymous and used interchangeably. This is a clear indication that Theodore would have reacted to Cyril's щМЫСИМ ЙАТэ ЖЩСИМ or УПЭСТАСИМ exactly as he would have had Cyril spoken of an щМЫСИМ ЙАТ' ОУСъАМ. The second point which must be made clear is the fact that Theodore is not objecting to a union or presence by nature because it would primarily imply a union ordained and imposed upon the I.ogos from the outside as in the case of the Arian teaching. He is clearly rejecting any indwelling by nature or by essence because this implies for him an inner necessity of the divine essence itself for union with what is created. One must realize that in Theodore he is confronting a doctrine of divine relations geared to protect the divine nature from a deterministic type of pantheism, on the one hand, and an unconcerned and absolutely transcendental type unmoved mover, on the other. Far Theodore to allow any ЙАТ' ОУСъАМ union or indwelling of God in a creature would be a capitulation to Aristotelian enemies and a reversal of the Stagirite's categories of relations. For God to be related by nature to what is created would make the creature out to be the unmoved mover. Therefore, God does not work His presence in or union with creatures by nature. He only happens to be present everywhere according to essence because His nature cannot be contained by any place. ^{[ 95 ]}

Underlying Theodore's concept of divine relations is a clear distinction between nature and will, which one finds again in Nestorius. This distinction is based only partly, as we shall see, on Theodore's doctrine of the Trinity. The Three Persons of the Trinity are related to each other by a necessity of nature, whereas they can be related to creatures only by will. Thus the Father is not Creator because He is Father, neither is He Father because He is Creator. He is Father because He begets His San from His very essence, whereas He is Creator because He so wills to create. Creatures are very far from His essence, being products of the divine will. The Father is Father by nature, whereas He is Creator by will. ^{[ 96 ]}

Such distinctions, so obvious in Theodore's theology, between what is in God by nature and what God does by energy and will, or between God in His Essence and God in His Glory, were common in the ancient Church ^{[ 96a ]} apparently for various reasons which seem to be distinguishable into three general groups:

1) The first and most primitive type of such a distinction may be found in such a writer as St. Irenaeus ^{[ 97 ]} who finds the distinction between God in Himself and Gad in His uncreated Glory or power in the Old Testament. ^{[ 98 ]} To see God is not to see His essence but to see Him in His glory or divinity. ^{[ 99 ]} St. Gregory the Theologian states," . . when I looked closer [behind the cloud of Mt. Sinai], I saw, not the First and unmingled Nature, known to Itself - to the Trinity, I mean; not That which abideth within the first veil, and is hidden by the Cherubim; but only that [Nature] which at last even reaches to us. And that is, as far as I can learn, the Majesty, or as holy David calls it, the Magnificence which is manifested among the creatures, which He has produced and governs. For these are the Back Parts of God, etc." ^{[ l00 ]} These distinctions are found also in St. Basil, St. Gregory of Nyssa and the whole Eastern tradition and presuppose a certain understanding of the prophetic experience which underlies Orthodox Triadology and Christology ^{[ 100a ]} and presents a definite understanding of Biblical inspiration and of the use of divine names quite foreign to Theodore's theology.

2) A second and further elaboration of the distinction between divine essence and will was clearly formulated by St. Athanasius, ^{[ 101 ]} who relegated the generation of the Son to the essential aspect of the divine mystery, thereby rejecting all conceptual explanations, and ascribed the act of creating to the will of God. What is from the essence of the Father belongs to the very nature of God, and what is from non-being by the will of God is a creature. The Father's begetting the Son and creating the world are not the same, as the Arians claimed. Thus we believe in the Son ЦЕММГХщМТА ЙАъ ОУ ПОИГХщМТА of the Nicean Creed. St. Athanasius would go so far as to say, "As far then as the Son transcends the creature, by so much does what is by nature transcend the will." ^{[ 102 ]}

3) As we have already seen, Theodore follows these Athanasian distinctions in regard to the doctrine of the Trinity. However, there are indications that this was done with some very important variations which are clearly products of a moralistic metaphysic developed primarily by certain theological groups within the geographical area of the Oriental Diocese of the Roman Empire.

Faced with the need to combat determinism in both its ethical and cosmological or philosophical forms, it seems that a Syrian theological tradition was created which emphasized the superiority of what is done according to will as over against what is done by nature. What is done by nature can neither be praised nor rewarded nor justly punished, whereas what is done by will is indicative of a higher form of life. A man who realizes his own freedom to will what is good can occupy himself with meritorious works, on the one hand, for the reward of eternal life, and at the same time become instrumental for the betterment of society. Such a moralistic foundation would overcome the pessimism of pagan religions and philosophies and at the same time would be conducive to building up the moral stamina of the Roman Empire. Within such categories there would automatically be a strong tendency to think of divine adoption primarily as a reward which comes at the end of a process of meritorious living and the Biblical doctrine of grace and sin would become subordinated to this principle. The grace of God would not be so much a gift bestowed upon man in order to liberate him from the enemy, but a reward bestowed upon him because he has fulfilled the law. The destruction of Israel's enemies would not be the work of God's glory, but rather the work of Israel who would thereupon be rewarded with the glory of God for such meritorious efforts. Such an inversion of the Biblical pattern is perhaps the most characteristic feature of Theodore's Christology. In this respect Galtier is entirely wrong in claiming that the sole initiative for the incarnation lies with the Son of God. For Theodore, God unites Himself by will to the assumed man, but this union. is dependent on God's foreknowledge of the assumed man's merits. Theodore could not imagine that one could preserve both the freedom of God and Christ otherwise.

In reading through the Catechetical Homilies one is impressed by the frequency with which the words mutability and immutability occur in connection with either the concept of sin and perfection on the one hand or the nature of God on the other. The Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Truth because Its very nature is immutable and capable of bestowing this immutability upon man. What is immutable is true and what is subject to change is falsehood. ^{[ l03 ]} Man is a sinner because of his mutable nature and because he is involved in the process of change. When he is resurrected he will receive immortality of body and immutability of the sou1. ^{[ 104 ]} Both the mind and will of man will become

conformed to the will of God and to the Truth which is the divine nature, and thus man shall partake of the divine immutability and become forever happy. ^{[ l05 ]}

It seems that one is here confronting the Hellenistic idea that change and motion are either evil or negative in meaning, whereas only immutability and changelessness are of eternal significance and conducive to true security and happiness. ^{[ l05a ]} This of course means that freedom of choice and human activity could be for Theodore only a temporary stage to the beatific vision, which in reality is the petrification of human will and energy. within such a frame of references human will and activity in this life are the foundation upon which one gains the merits needed for the attainment of immutability and immobility in the next life. Actually then, salvation is participation in the divine immutability whereby the nature of man and God are joined in one act of willing and knowing.

By distinguishing between what God does by will and what belongs to the divine nature Theodore is able to overcome or avoid the philosophical problem of divine relations and makes possible a reciprocal relationship between God and man. He thus lays the metaphysical foundations for a moralistic ethic which merits changelessness and immutability and happiness in the future life. It is exactly within such a context that he develops his Christology. The relationship between natures cannot be according to nature or essence since this would mean a necessary conjunction which could neither be praiseworthy nor any real moral example for anyone to follow.

The union of the two natures in Christ is effected then by goodwill and good-pleasure. However, there is in Christ a special and unique example of such a union, since there was no time when the human nature existed independently of this conjunction based on the divine foreknowledge of the assumed man's merits. Furthermore, whereas all other men have only partial participation in the grace of God, the man Jesus. has a complete communion effected by the perfect conjunction of natures. Because of this conjunction there is in Christ only one will and one energy. Still, the assumed man undergoes a process of perfection which is not completed until the resurrection, when perfect immutability is attained. Starting from such presuppositions concerning the relationship between sinfulness and mutability or between perfection and immutability Theodore comes pretty close to saying that Christ was actually sinful prior to His resurrection. ^{[ 106 ]} The very existence of two wills and energies in Christ would clearly presuppose a lack of immutability on the human side and therefore some measure of imperfection and sinfulness. Therefore if there is a real conjunction of natures in Christ there must be one will and one energy. In Theodore one clearly finds a Nestorian type Monotheletism and Monenergism which perhaps goes some way to explaining its diophysite counterpart of the seventh century. There is some possibility that the presuppositions of the heresies condemned by the Sixth Ecumenical Council are to be found not so much in Monophysitism as in Nestorianism.

It seems clear enough that underlying Theodore's thought is a moralism in this life topped by a Platonic type of eudaimonia in the next. Such a concept of human destiny lacks any real understanding of the Biblical doctrine of creation and freedom and logically leads to eschatological determinism, to the МщЙЯЫСИР and not to the ЙэХАЯСИР of human will and energy. Salvation is the abolition of human freedom by the absolute submission of the will, not to the will of God, but to some sort of stiff and impersonal and motionless immutability. Thus, if Christ is perfect, He can have no natural will belonging to the very essence of human nature and differing by the will o f God from the will of God. Nor can there be any proper activity or energy of the creature which is not a duplication of the immutable and immobile divine nature. Not to be a duplication is in reality to be sinful.

The doctrine of meritorious works in this life with the promise of reward in terms of immutability and happiness in the next, transformed into a metaphysical system concerning the nature of God and the world, seems to be at the very basis not only of Theodore's theology, but also of other heretical movements originating in the Oriental Diocese generally. That God can be related to other essences only by will and never by nature is a basic presupposition of Paul of Samosata's Christology. He claims that "the wisdom of God was not united essentially to the human element from its birth, but according to quality (ЙАТэ ПОИЭТГТА)." ^{[ l07 ]} In a fragment whose authenticity is doubted he says, "Different natures and different persons have one and only mode of union, accord according to will, from which appears the unit (ЛОМэР) of those thus united to each other according to energy." ^{[ 108 ]} In Christ there is one will. "Do not be surprised that the Savior had one will with God. For as nature shows one and the same essence existing of [or in] many, thus the relationship of love accomplishes one and the same will of [or in] many by means of one and the same manifested satisfaction." ^{[ 109 ]} All who reach the state of eudaimonia have one willing and knowing with each other and God and thus the divine will and energy becomes the only will and energy. What is done by nature is not praiseworthy. "What prevails by reason of nature merits no praise. But what prevails by the relationship of love is praiseworthy, prevailing by one and the same energy and motion which never ceases to increase, according to which the Savior, having been conjoined to God, is never separated unto the ages, having with Him one and the same will and energy eternally moving unto the manifestation of good things." ^{[ 110 ]} G. Bardy points out some similarities which exist between the ideas expressed in this fragment and those in Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia. ^{[ 111 ]} In this respect noteworthy is Paul's insistence that in Christ there is one will and energy, and the union of natures is effected by a relationship according to love, will, and opinion. Theodore also speaks of one energy and will in Christ and claims that the Logos is in the man "according to the relationship of opinion" ^{[ 112 ]} or the Logos united the man to Himself "by the relationship of opinion."^{[ 113 ]}

The philosophical problems involved in the doctrine of divine relationships did not obviously present Paul of Samosata with serious difficulty as far as the doctrine of the Trinity is concerned, since the divine Persons were for him unhypostatic energies. ^{[ 114 ]} However, the application of the category of necessity or necessary being to the divine nature and the preservation of the real relations of God toward creation by the above mentioned philosophical distinction between nature and will, or between what God does by a necessity of nature and what He does by will, automatically introduces difficulties not only into Christology, but also into the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, especially when the hypostatic character of the Persons is admitted. Is the Father related to the hypostatic Logos by nature or by will? In order to preclude Valentinian type of necessary emanations and Manichaean divisions of the divine nature Arius and his followers insisted on a relationship of will. ^{[ ll5 ]} There can be no essential relationship of the two. There is no reason to suspect any sophistical trick in the Arian claim that "Unless He has by will come to be, therefore God had a Son by necessity and against His good pleasure." ^{[ 116 ]} For the Arians, as for Paul, Theodore and Nestorius, what is by nature is by necessity.

The Orthodox answer to this Arian objection is quite clear. Necessity is contrary to will, while what is according to nature is far above will and completely beyond the conceptual powers of man. No logical categories or concepts can be applied to the unknown nature of God. The Arians have no right to apply the categories of necessity and will to the divine nature. "Forgetting, however, that they are hearing about God's Son, they dare to apply human contrarities in the instance of God, `necessity' and `beside purpose,' to be able thereby to deny that there is a true Son of God. For let them tell us themselves, that God is good and merciful, does this attach to Him by will or not? If by will, we must consider that He began to be good, and that His not being good is possible; for to councel and choose implies an inclination two ways, and is incidental to a rational nature. But if it be too unseemly that He should be called good and merciful upon will, then let them hear what they themselves have said `therefore by necessity and not at His pleasure He is good'; and, 'who is it that imposes this necessity on Him ?' But if it be unseemly to speak of necessity in the case of God, and therefore it is by nature that He is good, much more is He, and more truly, Father of the Son by nature and not by will."^{[ 117 ]} The Holy Trinity is the pre-existing primordial reality, but beyond all concepts of reality, necessity and being. God is certainly free, but not in any moralistic sense of opposition between what is by necessity of nature and what is by will. God is what He is by nature and not by any necessity or will. God is not free by will, but by His very nature. He is not subject to the moralistic metaphysics of any moralistic philosophy as imagined by both Arians and Nestorians. St. Cyril devotes much time to a refutation of the Arians on this point in his work "On the Consubstantial Trinity," ^{[ 118 ]} written before the outbreak of the Nestorian Controversy. St. Gregory the Theologian writes, "Let us not ever look on this generation as involuntary, like some natural overflow, hard to be retained." ^{[ 119 ]}

One may add at this. point that salvation is not a matter of doing good things by will as opposed to the necessities of nature, but rather a renewal of the natural freedom of human nature itself. The doctrine of human will as distinguished from the necessary or natural appetites of human nature can be justified only within a moralistic complex in which correct choices in this life lead to the reward of happiness and motionless satisfaction in the next, which in reality is a final victory of what is taken as the necessary drive toward the contemplation of immutable realities. Motion and change are only of temporary significance and enable man freely to choose the exchange of his freedom of will for happiness. However, in the Orthodox tradition this is pure rubbish and leads to Monotheletism and Monenergism unless the perfection of Christ's human nature is sacrificed. Man's destiny is not happiness, but natural freedom. In Christ there was no "deliberative will" (ХщКГЛА ЦМЫЛИЙЭМ), but a "natural will" (ХщКГЛА ЖУСИЙЭМ) and "natural freedom." In His human nature Christ was not free by an act of will. He was free by His very nature. Therefore, He really had or has two natural wills and energies, divine and human, without any connotation of sinfulness. For Platonized forms of Christianity, which understand the fall of man in terms of lack of happiness and immutability, this is not possible. Purity and sinlessness in the Bible are not immobility of a satisfied mind and will conjoined to immutable realities, but rather the freedom of the heart or, in modern terms, of the sub-conscious. A person can will good things all he wants, but unless his heart or subconscious is purified by the grace or glory of God, his works are of no avail and he is still a captive to demonic influences. Willful good works which are not products of a heart being purified by divine grace are not only not meritorious, but, much worse, they are satanic. Good works produced by a filthy sub-conscious and a rationalistic self-justifying self-assertiveness can be nothing else.

One can get a good glimpse into an aspect of the metaphysical background of Arianism and Nestorianism by turning to some interesting documents attributed to St. Justin Martyr and dated between the middle of the fourth and the first half of the fifth centuries. ^{[ l20 ]} These works definitely belong geographically to the Syrian province and are strongly Nestorian in tendency. The idea that the Logos works by essence his special presence in Christ, His Temple, is rejected. ^{[ 121 ]} The special presence takes place in Christ rather in the sense that being the purest of all temples He has the greatest degree possible of participation "not in divine nature but in divine honor by the good-will of the Logos." ^{[ 122 ]} This union is likened unto participation in the rays of the sun which shine equally on all. Yet the purer and more powerful the contemplating eye the more perfect and complete is the participation. In this sense is the Logos present in His own Temple in a special manner.^{[ l23 ]} He cannot be especially present in Christ by nature since He happens to be by essence everywhere present.^{[ l24 ]}

In another document evidently by the same author one comes across the following: "If God creates by nature, He creates whatever He creates by necessity. But if He creates by will, He creates authoritatively. Creating authoritatively, He creates as much as He wills and whatever He wills and whenever He wills."^{[ 125 ]} In another work of this same collection we find the following question and answer: "If to be in potentiality is considered inferior to being in actuality, how does the Creator of the world, being Creator in potentiality and not in actuality before the creation of the world, not fall under the title of inferiority? The answer: They whose power of act is determined by some natural necessity are those whose power is considered inferior to the Act. Whosoever's power of act is determined by will and not by some natural necessity is not in the category of inferiority." ^{[ 126 ]} It is quite strange that having such presuppositions, this same author accepts the essential relationship of the three divine Hypostases.^{[ l27 ]} What type of answer could he have given to the Arian objections to the generation by necessity? It is perhaps not surprising that his language in places indicates that he may have been a converted Arian who had not completely overcome his former way of thinking. The Logos and Spirit are God by participation and are deemed worthy of divinity. He writes for example: "For since the Father begat the Son from His proper essence, and from the same [essence] projected the Spirit, naturally (ЕИЙЭТЫР) partaking of one and the same essence, they were deemed worthy of one and the same divinity (ТчР АУТчР ЙАъ ЛИэР ХЕЭТГТОР ГНъЫМТАИ)."^{[ 128 ]}

It seems clear enough that once the moralistic metaphysical distinction between what God is by a necessity of nature and what He does by will is introduced into the field of Biblical theology one is immediately caught up into the Samosatene, Arian and Nestorian problematics concerning the divine relations. That these were vital problems for the theologians of the Oriental Diocese should not be surprising to the modern theologian, especially to anyone familiar with the contradictions of the Thomistic system, which is forced to deny any real relationship of God toward creation in order to avoid pantheism. The Orthodox Fathers of the Church refused to apply any categories or names to the divine essence, let alone the category of necessary being, and thereby could freely speak of the Logos uniting Himself by nature to human nature in order to emphasize the reality of the incarnation of One of the hypostatic Persons of the Trinity. Of course the terms "hypostatic union" and "natural union" are not definitions of what is a complete mystery. The divine essence is by its very nature radically unknown to any creature. "Natural union" can therefore only mean a "real union." This the Nestorians could not accept because for them it would mean a defined and determined union which would destroy the very basis of their moralistic ethics of merits and rewards and deprive their type of anti-deterministic metaphysic of its very foundations. It is only when one realizes this essential point that he can fully grasp the violent Nestorian reaction to Cyril's "natural and hypostatic union."

Theodoret argued that this cannot be because "nature is something necessary and without will." ^{[ 129 ]} Cyril takes him to task for daring to apply such a category to the divine nature. ^{[ l30 ]} The Oriental bishops see in this term a recurrence of the Apollinarin heresy. Natures work by necessity only when created by God to function in a predetermined manner. God operates not by necessity but by will or grace.^{[ l31 ]} Exactly in this respect the Orientals agree with the Arians in principle. God cannot unite Himself by nature to creatures. For the Arians this is proof that the Logos is a creature because united by the will of his creator to human nature in such a way that the union is natural and predetermined from without. For the Syrians the Logos cannot be united by nature to His Temple because He is God. Nestorius is, of course, the classical exponent of these presuppositions. "A voluntary union cannot be a natural union. If then they say that the union of the natures resulted in one nature, even though we ourselves should concede to them that it took place voluntarily, yet after it took place, the union existed not voluntarily in that the natures have acquired it. And it suffers as being united, whether it will or not, and accepts the sufferings of that nature to which it has been united, since it is defined by it and not by impassability nor by immortality nor by infinity. For the definition and circumscription of all nature is that in which it has to be." ^{[ 132 ]} It is quite obvious that Nestorius is a stranger to the Orthodox patristic apophaticism which denies any application of definitions or concepts to the divine nature.

As we have seen, Theodore is also involved in the general Oriental metaphysical scheme with its peculiar reduction of God to the categories of necessary being as opposed to what God does by will. What is by nature is by necessity. "The reason of union according to essence is true only in the case of consubstantials, but in the case of things not consubstantial it is not applicable, there being no clear (reason) possible for confusion." ^{[ 133 ]} Theodore accepts the principle that metaphysical rules and concepts can be applied to the divine nature. Apart from the unique exception in the case of the Divine Consubstantials Gad can be united and related to non-consubstantials only by energy and goodwill. "For thus the infinity is unto Him better preserved, when He does not appear to work by some necessity of the uncircumscribed nature. For if He is omnipresent by will, He will again be found working by necessity, no longer working the presence by opinion, but by the infinity of nature, and having the will following." ^{[ 134 ]}

The last point we wish to make regards Theodore's Biblical method and especially his doctrine of inspiration. In this respect he differs radically from the central Orthodox patristic tradition and has points of contact with the Eunomeans and the traditional fundamentalism of Western theology. Perhaps Theodore's understanding of prophecy and inspiration explains more than anything else his metaphysical approach to Christology. There are two specific doctrines of inspiration which concern us here, the one which believes that God actually dictated words to those who were objects of His revelations, and the other which believes that God revealed His uncreated Glory and Will to the prophets and apostles who in turn transposed their suprarational and suprasentient experience into the idiom established by the prophetic tradition to convey their message in direct proportion to the spiritual capacities and needs of the various levels of people addressed.

a) One of the best examples of a fundamentalistic literalist doctrine of inspiration in the Ancient Church is that of Eunomius'35 who believed that the very names of things exist eternally in the mind of God and constitute the very definitions of essences. Besides these uncreated names and determinations of creatures there are also eternal and uncreated names of God which are revealed in Scripture and constitute- definitions of the divine nature. One can see clearly the intimate connection between the Eunomean doctrines of God and Biblical Inspiration. Since the names "Father" and "Unbegottenness" are eternal definitions of the divine essence, it follows that the names "Son" and "Begottenness" must be designations of another and created essence.

b) In direct opposition to Eunomius, St. Gregory of Nyssa rejects the contention that names are eternal and insists that all words and languages are products of human accommodations to the necessities. of communication on the human level, and all concepts either conveyed by words or simply contemplated can never extricate themselves from their creaturely qualities. Knowledge of God, therefore, cannot be conceptual. God cannot be reached by contemplation. God is not like anything man experiences either intellectually or by sensation. Knowledge o f God can come only by revelation and knowledge about God can be had only from those who have been the objects of this revelation, which is above all rational and sentient categories. It is a knowledge which can be indicated but not conveyed by human language or concepts. He who has been graced with revelation can only point to the Glory of God. Only God can reveal His proper Glory to whom He chooses. This is why Christ revealed His Own Proper Glory which is at once His and the Father's. The Bible, therefore, is not inspired because dictated verbally by God, but because either written by or about those who have and are encountering God in His Self-revelation which is not a conveyance of words and images. ^{[ l36 ]} St. Gregory writes , "Neither, then, did God speak in the Hebrew language, nor did He express Himself according to any form in use among the Gentiles. but whatsoever of God's words are recorded by Moses or the Prophets, are indications of the Divine will, illuminating, now in one way, now in another, the pure intellect of those holy men, according to the measure of grace of which they were partakers. Moses, then, spoke his mother-tongue, and that in which he was educated. But he repeatedly attributed these words to God, as I have said, on account of the immaturity of those who were being brought to the knowledge of God, in order to give a clear representation of the divine will, and to render his hearers more obedient, as being awed by the authority of the speaker." ^{[ 137 ]} It is only in the New Testament that one confronts actual human words of the Incarnate Logos, but even these words are not uncreated definitions of eternal truths. They are the pedagogical means which point the way to seeing the Ruling Power of God which is beyond all concepts and forms, yet made manifest in the human nature of the Logos.

As we have already seen, Theodore of Mopsuestia follows the Eunomean interpretive method of applying the Biblical names of God to the divine nature. He also seems to follow the Eunomeans in their contention that God revealed words to the prophets. Theodore explains that God operated His revelation upon the prophets in such a way that the impression was created upon them that they were hearing someone speak, ЧСТЕ ДОЙЕъМ АУТОЩР ЧСПЕЯ ТИМЭР КАКОЩМТОР АЙОЩЕИМ ТЕ ЙАъ ПАИДЕЩСХАИ ^{[ l38 ]} In another passage ^{[ l39 ]} Theodore seems to be repeating the divine language theories of Eunomius. He explains that Moses does not record God's saying anything in the first instance of creation ("In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth") because there were as yet no creatures (angels) to reap any benefit from such verbal instruction. Once angels did come into existence then God began to speak for their sake since His essence was to them invisible. Had He not spoken they would have remained without proper knowledge of their Creator. Theodore is here attacking St. Basil who believes that the angels were created before heaven and earth. In other words, if St. Basil were correct the Bible should read, "God said, l.et there be heaven and earth." St. Gregory of Nyssa had already anticipated Theodore on this in his refutation of Eunomius' similar understanding of Genesis, where God is pictured as speaking and applying already existing names to the things He is creating. ^{[ 140 ]}

It is interesting to note that according to the Mopsuestian the angels were in need of divine speech for instruction since they could not see the divine essence. To understand what he means by this one must recall the fact that for Theodore those saved do have a vision of and conjunction with the divine nature when rewarded with immutability and happiness in the next life. This means that Theodore is referring to the angels before the fall. To have had the vision of the divine nature from the very beginning would contradict the Mops╥uestian's moralistic metaphysics. Vision of the divine nature at creation would mean perfect satisfaction, happiness and immutability from the very beginning and no logical possibility for a fall. ^{[ 141 ]} This would upset the scheme of the Antiochene moralism described above since there would be no distinction between what is by nature and what is by will and angels would be completely happy and immutable by nature. The same would be true for man. Otherwise the whole structure of merits and rewards would tumble. The vision of God in His uncreatedness would be putting the reward before the accumulation of merits and would make the fall logically impossible. Hence the extreme importance for God to communicate His Will to angels and men by the medium of words, concepts and created impressions. The fact that the impression of hearing a voice is an inward experience and not something imposed on the senses from without does not absolve Theodore of the charge of having an anthropomorphic understanding of revelation, as H. Kihn believes. ^{[ 142 ]} For God to speak to prophets from without or from within is substantially the same thing since in both instances God is conveying and the prophet is receiving words.

It naturally follows from Theodore's moralistic metaphysics that the prophetic claim to seeing God in His uncreated Glory would be relegated to the realm of divinely inspired imagination. This is exactly how he explains Isaiah's claim to have seen God: "When Isaiah says he saw God and the Seraphim, he also heard voices coming toward him. For this. reason he sometimes says, The word of the Lord which was upon so and so, meaning by word the energy by which he believed he was learning what was fitting, being taught by a certain voice, and at other times (he says) vision, which he saw here or there, meaning by this the revelation, according to which, believing to see something (ОЯэМ Тъ ДОЙЧМ), he learned what was proper." ^{[ 143 ]} Seeing the glory of God is no more than an imaginary process, even though produced by Divine inspiration. The cause of this revelation is uncreated, but the effect is a created impression of voices and visions.

This understanding of seeing the Glory of God is from the Orthodox patristic viewpoint sheer heresy, but on the other hand much more refined than the grossly superstitious concept of Augustine which became common in the West and in the person of Barlaam the Calabrian was finally condemned by the Palamite Council of 1341. ^{[ 144 ]} According to Augustine what the prophets and apostles saw was not anything uncreated, ^{[ l45 ]} since for him the very substance of God is alone uncreated and visible only in the next life (with the possible exception of the ecstatic visions of Moses and Paul). Rather, in seeing the glory of God the prophets saw and heard created things which temporarily came into existence and passed away and received their revelations (visions and words) by means of these creatures. ^{[ l46 ]} Thus from the Old Testament viewpoint Augustine and his followers "changed the Glory of the incorruptible God for the likeness of an image of corruptible man." (Rom. 1:23). As for Theodore so for Augustine the vision of God comes at the end of all actions, since the contemplation of the divine substance means satisfaction of all desires, i.e. happiness and immutability. "For this contemplation is held forth to us as the end of all actions, and the everlasting fullness of joy. . . . For we shall not seek anything else when we shall have come to the contemplation of Him." ^{[ 147 ]} So long as man is involved in mutability and mortality it is impossible for him to see God. In his present condition man can see only changeable things. ^{[ l48 ]} Augustine and Theodore seem to be in perfect accord.

For the biblical writers, however, for the so-called Asia Minor School, for Justin, for the Alexandrian Theologians, for the Cappadocians, for Hilary of Poitiers, and for the Orthodox patristic tradition generally, to see the Glory of God does not belong to the realm of divinely inspired imagination or Augustinian wonder-working. Rather it is a real and actual vision of God enthroned upon His Uncreated Majesty. The Glory of God is His very Throne, Power, Kingdom (БАСИКЕъА), the Unapproachable Light in which He eternally dwells. God is the "King and Lord of Glory" which alone can be known to creatures both in this life and the next, when God will be seen as He is. In spite of the partial and limited character of the prophetic and apostolic experience of seeing the Majesty of God, it is still the very Uncreated Glory that they saw be f ore they parted this life. The Glory of God is His Godhead (not essence) and Ruling Power by which He saves Israel from her enemies and the Church from the rule of Satan.

The miracles and resurrection of Christ only point to this Glory of God and by themselves could never have demonstrated more than the fact that God was acting in the man Jesus. The climax of New Testament Revelation is the fact that He who was born of the Virgin and is Son of David revealed the Uncreated Glory of His Father as His own natural and proper Glory, and thereby revealed His proper Godhead. "Light . . . was That Godhead Which was shewn upon the Mount [of transfiguration] to the disciples - and a little too strong for their eyes." ^{[ 149 ]} The Primitive Christians did not come to believe in the Godhead of Christ by a hit and miss process. Rather the Apostles and many others saw and continue to see (God is not only He Who Acted, but He Who Acts) the Godhead or Glory of Christ. The Apostles learned by experience that Christ is the "Lord of Glory," the very same "King of Glory" Who revealed Himself to the Old Testament prophets ( John 12, 41 ) . It is exactly because he was confronted by the Glory of Christ that St. Paul learned to speak of the Crucified Lord of Glory (I Cor. 2, 8) .

The Biblical writers and the Orthodox Fathers were not hampered in recognizing the reality of the Old and New Testament Theophanies because of any Hellenistic and moralistic doctrine of human destiny. Man's destiny is not immutability of mind and will by a Platonic contemplation of immutable truths. The destiny of man is freedom. Neither are works meritorious. ^{[ 150 ]} Besides, the wicked will also come to the knowledge of Truth ^{[ 151 ]} by seeing the Uncreated Glory of God, but to them God will be a consuming fire, the eternal fire of hell (Lk. 16:19-31). For platonized forms of Christian intellectualism this would be impossible. ^{[ l52 ]} Hence the ideas of hell entertained by same traditions for whom the vision of God could only mean happiness.

Both Augustine and Theodore of Mopsuestia reject the Old Testament revelatory and epistemological foundation of New Testament Christology and Triadology. ^{[ 153 ]} However, the bishop of Hippo had a legalistic and authoritarian understanding of the Church's dogmas, accepting them at first on faith, and then trying hard the rest of his life to understand them conceptually by contemplation. In the Orthodox tradition there is also a distinction between faith and knowledge, but knowledge is here the vision of and participation in God's Glory, not the contemplation of the eternal and immutable ideas of Plato. "Attack the ideas of Plato," says St. Gregory the Theologian to the Eunomians. ^{[ l54 ]} In contrast to Augustine, Theodore of Mopsuestia was not so much limited by an obedience to an ecclesiastical authority as he was by the metaphysical principles in the air of his theological environment. In view of his understanding of the Old Testament Theophanies and because of his Antiochene metaphysical concept of God and his Hellenistic understanding of human destiny, it is no wonder that St. Paul's crucified Lord of Glory had not the slightest effect in conditioning his Christology. If the Lord of Glory was crucified in His humanity, He was certainly born as man in His humanity, so that He Who was born of the Virgin is consubstantial with the Father, and Mary is Theotokos with no Nestorian strings attached. The very idea of a man becoming or being Lord of Glory by adoption is sheer nonsense, if not as blasphemous as worshipping an adopted man. That the Old Testament Messiah is the anointed of God is a statement of fact which does not abrogate the reality that the King of Glory humbled and emptied Himself in becoming Son of David and anointed King of Israel. St. Cyril of Alexandria over and over again uses St. Paul's Crucified Lord of Glory in expounding Biblical Christology. However, this did not make the slightest dent in the rationalistic metaphysical mind of Nestorius who no doubt held opinions about the Old Testament vision of the Lord of Glory and Biblical inspiration similar to those of Theodore.

The opinion generally prevails that Theodore's Christology is based on an inductive historico-biblical method which begins by recognizing the full humanity of Christ and tries from this point to solve the problem of the unity of subject in Christ. This is clearly a myth. Theodore, like many others of the Oriental Diocese, is a moralistic metaphysician who applies concepts and definitions to the divine nature and'. in advance determines what is for God possible and what is not. According to his doctrine of divine relations it is impossible far God to unite Himself by nature to human nature. His starting point is not the human nature of Christ, nor is it the biblical witness as history, but rather a definition and limitation of divine nature in terms of a necessity distinguished from will. It is exactly because of this transcendental starting point that Theodore's doctrine of the Trinity has no- room for any real distinction between hypostasis and essence. In Cappadocian and Alexandrian Triadology the reality of the Divine Hypostases as distinguished from the divine essence is grounded in the belief that the Second Hypostasis of the Trinity really and truly lived and willed and suffered as a real and complete man and that He really and truly was resurrected in the flesh to become the first-born from the dead. ^{[ l55 ]} For Theodore there is no need to distinguish between the hypostasis of the Logos and the nature of the Logos because the one person effected by the union of natures not only is not the Only-Begotten Son of God, as Sullivan clearly demonstrates, but also cannot be an hypostasis of the Trinity. Natural or hypostatic union is for Theodore a necessary union. There can be no doubt that Theodore would have wholeheartedly supported the attack on St. Cyril. Whether he would have changed his mind about the double consubstantiality of the One and Unique Hypostasis born of the Virgin when faced by the decision of the Fourth Ecumenical Council one can never know. On the other hand one can not preclude the very strong possibility that Theodore may have remained more faithful to Nestorius than did Theodoret and the other Antiochenes.

There are solid enough reasons for believing that the Fifth Ecumenical Council had no business condemning Theodore who had died in communion with the Church, but there are no reasons for putting forth the notion that this was made possible by some kind of reversal to a one-sided Cyrilianism or neo-chalcedonianism which supposedly upset the balance of strict chalcedonianism. The dogmatic decisions of the Fifth Council are no different from those of Chalcedon and any claim that Theodore passes the test of chalcedonian Christology is unrealistic. C. Moeller is no doubt correct when he claims that the anathemas of the Fifth Council are strange to modern Roman sensitivities. If he and other Roman theologians studied more carefully the Christology of Chalcedon and the Triadology of the First and Second Councils, they would further discover that their theology is not in accord with these either, especially in regard to the Biblical doctrine of Revelation and Grace which underlies all Orthodox Patristic Theology.

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FOOTNOTES